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We consider a consumption model that takes into account the valuation and demand 
uncertainties  that consumers face while using access services. Typical examples of such 
services include telecommunication services, extended warranties for consumer electronics, 
and club memberships. We demonstrate that consumption is affected by contract structure 
(pay-peruse vs. three part tariffs) even if the optimal consumption plans are identical. We find 
that  a majority of individuals correctly use a threshold policy that is similar to a nearly 
optimal heuristic, however they use the free units too quickly leading to overconsumption and 
lost surplus. These errors are partially driven by mistaken beliefs about the value distribution. 
We also measure subjects’ willingness to pay for a contract with free access units, and we 
find that nearly half of subjects are willing to pay at least the full per-unit price, with a 
substantial fraction  willing to overpay. The optimal firm strategy is therefore to offer a 
contract that presells access units at a very small discount; this strategy increases revenue by 8 
− 15% compared to only offering a pay-per-use contract. 
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December 23, 2011 1 Introduction
Nonlinear pricing of access (subscription) services such as telecommunication, car leasing, club
memberships, and product warranties has received a great deal of attention from both researchers
and practitioners. Research up to date studies how ﬁrms should structure the tariﬀs (pay-per-use,
two part tariﬀ, three part tariﬀ, and unlimited usage) and examines the drivers of consumer’s tariﬀ
choice. Wilson (1993) reviews the literature on proﬁt- and welfare-maximizing tariﬀ structures.
The fundamental assumptions of much of this literature are that consumers are rational decision
makers who choose the surplus maximizing tariﬀ and the pricing structure does not inﬂuence
consumer’s value for the service. However, recent studies (Thomas and Morwitz 2005, Soman
2001) show that pricing structures themselves may aﬀect the usage decisions. Indeed, Bertini and
Wathieu (2008) state that pricing can transform, as well as capture, the utility of an oﬀer.
The interaction eﬀect between the tariﬀ structure and usage is documented by recent research
on telecommunication services (Ascarza, Lambrecht and Vilcassim 2009) and health clubs (Della
Vigna and Malmendier 2006). These studies show that consumers do not necessarily choose the
tariﬀ that leads to the lowest billing rate for a given amount of consumption. Ascarza et al. ﬁnd
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in total consumption by consumers who choose a two-part and a three part
tariﬀ contract which cannot be explained by a change in the budget constraint. In a diﬀerent
context, Iyengar, Jedidi, Essegaier and Danaher (2010) ﬁnd that consumers have lower utility for
two part tariﬀs compared to pay-per-use tariﬀs, which results in lower usage of service for their
particular application. These results suggest that consumers make mistakes while maximizing
their surplus from the consumption of access services, and pricing structures inﬂuence the types
of mistakes they make. Identifying the mistakes and the behavioral biases that determine this
consumption behavior has important ramiﬁcations for pricing and optimal contract design.
Purchasing access services typically occurs in advance of consumption when consumers are gener-
ally uncertain about how much they will use the service and/or how valuable usage opportunities
are. This uncertainty makes the consumption problem quite complicated for the consumer. In this
paper, we investigate how diﬀerent contractual forms aﬀect in-contract consumption decisions. In
contrast to the earlier literature, we model the consumption process in detail and analyze the
consumer behavior after the purchase of the contract. In particular, we are interested in answer-
ing the following questions: 1) Is there a plausible heuristic that consumers use to make daily
2consumption decisions? 2) Given the heuristic used, does contractual form aﬀect consumption
behavior? 3) Do decision biases lead to substantially diﬀerent consumption behavior under cer-
tain contractual forms? 4) What are the implications of the interaction eﬀect between contractual
form and consumption for the ﬁrms?
To that end, we develop a theoretical model of consumption behavior for an individual who faces a
sequence of consumption opportunities, and has been endowed with a price contract. This model
identiﬁes the optimal consumption policy, as well as a nearly optimal heuristic. Furthermore,
we identify how consumption would shift under biases such as the over-(or under-) estimation of
consumption values, risk aversion, regret aversion, the sunk cost fallacy and the taxi meter aﬀect
(a physiological transaction cost such as distaste for payment at the time of consumption) .
We test our theoretical model by conducting a laboratory experiment where subjects repeatedly
perform a dynamic consumption “cell phone task”. In each task subjects are endowed with a
number of free phone calls (and charged an access fee), and then receive 30 calls whose value is
drawn randomly. For each call subjects decided whether to answer the call (and either use a free
call, or be charged the per-unit cost). We ﬁnd that a majority of subjects use a threshold policy,
and those that do not have substantially lower earnings. We also ﬁnd that subjects on average
use the correct threshold policy when they do not have any free calls. Subjects also adjust their
threshold in the correct direction as the optimal threshold (and nearly optimal heuristic) changes
as the remaining time and included free units in the contract deplete. We ﬁnd that the nearly
optimal heuristic matches their choices somewhat more closely than the optimal policy. However,
in line with previous empirical research, they are too aggressive in using their free calls, which
leads to sub-optimally answering too many calls, and answering too many calls of low value. These
mistakes cost subjects up to 20% of their payoﬀ, and subjects continue to make these mistakes
even after repetition of the consumption task.
We also measure subjects’ beliefs about the value distribution, their risk aversion, their regret
aversion and their propensity towards the sunk cost fallacy, as well as a measure of cognitive
ability. Previous research on the preference for contracts providing free units have suggested that
risk attitudes and the sunk cost fallacy may drive this contract-choice bias, so we examine if
these mechanisms can also aﬀect consumption behavior. Mistaken beliefs shift consumption in
an intuitive manner. Speciﬁcally, subjects who underestimate the value of future calls (either by
underestimating the frequency of high value calls or overestimating the frequency of low value
3calls) are more liberal in using their free calls. Other biases such as risk aversion and the sunk
cost fallacy do not aﬀect consumption behavior, although individuals with lower cognitive ability
are too conservative when they are given a pay per unit plan. In a second experiment we provide
subjects with the full call value distribution, and again ﬁnd that subjects signiﬁcantly overuse
their free units.
We then run a third experiment where we can directly measure subjects’ willingness to pay for
the contract with free calls (instead of the pay-per-use contract). When we oﬀered the 10 Calls
contract, we ﬁnd that almost 50% of subjects are willing to pay full price or more (i.e. pay in
advance at least as much as it would cost to answer the calls under pay-per-use contract), with
21% of subjects willing to pay more than the pay-per-use price. Strikingly, this latter group
increases over time to 27% in the fourth repetition. When oﬀered 20 Calls contract, more than
40% of subjects are willing to pay at least the pay-per-use price, with 8% willing to pay more.
Pre-purchasing the 20 Calls contract sacriﬁces substantial option value relative to the pay-per-use
contract, as only 51% of subjects receive 20 or more calls worth at least $ 0.35.
We also ﬁnd that in the 10 Calls WTP treatment the subjects who value free calls the most are
also those who answer the fewest calls under a pay-per-use contract. Therefore, oﬀering a contract
with a three part tariﬀ has three beneﬁts to the ﬁrm: price discrimination, sorting consumers into
their highest-revenue contract, and increasing the usage of consumers with free calls. We do not
ﬁnd a similar sorting eﬀect in the 20 Calls WTP treatment, indicating that the sorting behavior
may be aﬀected by the menu of contracts available.
We then calculate the optimal access fee (i.e. the revenue-maximizing price for the ﬁrm given
average consumer behavior under each kind of contract), and ﬁnd that the optimal discount from
the full pay-per-unit cost is very small. With the optimal fee, the ﬁrm increases revenue by 15%
by oﬀering the 10 Calls contract, and increases revenue by 8% by oﬀering the 20 Calls contract,
compared to only oﬀering a pay-per-use contract.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature. Section
3 presents the theoretical model of dynamic decision-making and develops a decision heuristic
that is asymptotically optimal. We also present the theoretical predictions on the consumption
of a consumer who is risk averse, over (under) estimating and has sunk cost fallacy. Section 4
describes the design of our main experiment, while Section 5 presents and analyzes the results.
We discuss our robustness-check experiment in Section 6, and the willingness-to-pay experiment
4in Section 7. Lastly, we discuss our results and conclude in Section 8.
2 Literature Review
We ﬁrst survey the existing literature on price discrimination in access service industries. Most of
the literature in this area assumes there are multiple types of consumers that diﬀer in their taste for
consumption, and that a monopolist ﬁrm oﬀers a menu of pricing contracts to induce consumers to
self-select into the appropriate contract given their type. Examples of non-linear pricing contracts
used in the telecommunications and utilities markets include pay-per-use contracts; two-part
tariﬀs with an access fee and a per-unit usage price; three-part tariﬀs with an access fee, some
number of free units and a pay-per unit usage price; and unlimited usage contracts (see Wilson
1993 and Tirole 1988 for a review of the economics literature on non-linear pricing).
Typically consumers must select the pricing contract signiﬁcantly in advance of the consumption
decisions, which introduces consumer uncertainty about future demand and consumption valua-
tions. At the time of the contract choice, the consumer has an estimate over her usage during the
contract duration but does not know the exact amount and the value of each consumption op-
portunity. Many papers have analyzed the eﬀects of demand uncertainty and measured its eﬀects
on pricing. Miravete (2002) estimates a structural econometric model of demand for ﬁxed-line
telephone service for a provider that oﬀers a two-part tariﬀ and a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, allowing for
uncertain future consumption. Lambrecht, Seim and Skiera (2007) ﬁnd that it is ex-ante optimal
to choose a tariﬀ with a higher usage allowance than would be optimal if they were not uncertain
over their demand.
The advance pricing and revenue management literature also suggests non-linear pricing solutions
for one time use services such as event tickets and air transportation (Xie and Shugan 2001,
Gallego and Sahin 2010). The fundamental assumption of all these papers is that consumers are
rational decision makers who seek to maximize their surplus. Moreover, this literature focus on the
contract purchase decisions rather than ex-post consumption behavior. Recently an operations
management literature has developed studying access service pricing using a queuing framework
where the service system may be congested. Most of this literature studies pay-per use pricing,
with a few exceptions that study subscriptions (access fee with unlimited usage). Randhawa
and Kumar (2008) compare per-use pricing with subscription pricing that imposes usage limits
(similar to Netﬂix’s policy). Cachon and Feldman (2011) compare pay-per use and subscription
5pricing when there are congestion costs. Bitran, Rocha e Oliveira and Schilkrut (2008) study
two-part tariﬀs where the ﬁrm’s pricing policy and service level (quality) aﬀects the dynamics of
their system over time through customer satisfaction. In our study, consumers do not experience
congestion costs, and we compare ex-post consumption behavior under a pay-per-use contract
and a three part tariﬀ. These types of contracts are common in car leasing, telecommunication
services, utilities where system congestion is rarely an issue for the consumer.
Another body of work focuses on decision biases and mistakes in tariﬀ choice. This literature has
found that the consumers often make mistakes in tariﬀ choice (Kridel, Lehman, and Weisman
1993; Miravete 2002, Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva 1987, DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006;
Nunes 2000). In particular, the behavioral literature has found that consumers exhibit a biased
preference for choosing a ﬂat rate contract (unlimited usage plans) over a pay-per-use option even if
it leads to a lower consumption value. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) identify risk aversion, demand
over-estimation, and a distaste for paying per consumption (“taxi-meter” eﬀect) as possible causes
of the ﬂat rate bias. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) show that health club users overestimate
their future usage by more than 100% and subsequently tend to choose ﬂat rates over pay-per-use
contracts. Several other papers consider the eﬀect of other consumer biases such as self control
problems on optimal nonlinear pricing (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004, Oster and Scott Morton
2005, Esteban and Miyagawa 2007, Plambeck and Wang 2011). Note that all of these papers
study static contract choice while we study the dynamic consumption decisions and mistakes of
consumers after the contract choice.
Recent empirical work has shown that within-month consumption is strongly aﬀected by the
contract terms beyond what can be explained by the change in marginal prices and budget con-
straints. In particular, Ascarza, Lambrecht and Vilcassim (2009) estimate that within individuals
demand satiation increases by 31.5% under a three-part tariﬀ (after controlling for budget ef-
fects). Ascarza et. al point out that a pricing plan may have attributes that alter and inﬂuence
the consumer’s usage decisions. To that end we model consumers who are uncertain about their
consumptions and make usage decisions taking into account the remaining balance of included free
units and time in their contract. This is an improvement over the existing literature which do not
typically looks into post tariﬀ behavior. Grubb and Osborne (2011) and Yao, Mela, Chiang and
Chen (2011) are two exceptions that analyze in contract consumer decisions using cellular-phone
data. We discuss how our ﬁndings support and diﬀer from those in Section 8.
6In summary our work is the ﬁrst experimental paper that focuses on the eﬀect of decision heuristics
and biases on the post tariﬀ choice consumption decisions. We compare three part tariﬀs to pay-
per-use and focus on the impact of over (under) estimation of consumption values, risk aversion,
regret aversion and the sunk cost and taxi meter eﬀects on the dynamic consumption decisions
and heuristics. Finally, we examine ﬁrm’s optimal contract.
3 Consumer Behavior and Theoretical Predictions
We will ﬁrst present our theoretical model and predictions. We study a three part tariﬀ (x,c,p)
where x is the access fee, c is the number of free units (initial allowance), p is the non-negative
per unit fee for any consumption over initial allowance. The coverage period of the contract is
assumed to be T periods. The consumer pays ﬁxed cost x for the right to use the service and c
free units. If her consumption turns out to be more than c, she pays a per unit fee p for each
additional unit. Notice that pay per unit contract (0,0,p) is a special case. We are interested in
in-contract consumption behavior and how the contract terms inﬂuence this behavior. We do not
study the contract purchase decisions and the optimal menu of contracts.
Consumers are uncertain about their exact consumption levels N(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T and the value of
each consumption, V . Whenever a consumption opportunity arises, consumers observe the actual
value of the opportunity and decide whether to consume a unit of service. First we consider a
risk neutral rational consumer who is uncertain about her consumption level and value of each
consumption opportunity. Consumption opportunities arise sequentially over time. She extracts
utility V from the consumption of each free unit. If she uses the service when she does not have
any free units, she pays pay-per-unit price p resulting in net beneﬁt of V − p. We ﬁrst study the
optimal dynamic consumption policy.
3.1 Dynamic Consumption Model and Optimal Policy
Most individuals use shortcuts and heuristics to maximize their utility from cellular phone, inter-
net or club membership contracts. Here, one of our goals is to identify heuristics that consumers
may use. To do this we ﬁrst solve the discrete time optimal control problem of an unboundedly ra-
tional consumer who holds an (x,c,p) contract with duration T. Then we derive easy to compute
heuristics that have similar structural properties with this dynamic optimal control problem.
We assume the value of each consumption- V follows a distribution such that a consumption
7opportunity with value v or less arises with probability F(v) = P(V ≤ v) at time t, and the con-
sumer adjusts her consumption strategy dynamically over time. We assume that with probability
F(0) no consumption opportunity arises. Each consumption uses one unit of service. With k
units left and t periods to go, the expected utility is given by
J(k,t) = E[max{v + J(k − 1,t − 1),J(k,t − 1)}], k > 0,t ≥ 1
J(k,t) = tE(V − p)+ k ≤ 0,t ≥ 0.
If there are t periods to go until the contract coverage ends, with probability ¯ F(0) a consumption
opportunity arises. Consumer observes the value of the service and decides whether to use the
service or not. If there are free units left in the contract and the consumer uses a free unit, then
her total expected utility is v+J(k−1,t−1) where J(k−1,t−1) is the optimal expected utility
with k − 1 free units and t − 1 periods to go. Otherwise, the consumer’s expected utility is given
by J(k,t−1). If she has no free units left and there are t periods to go until the contract expires,
she uses the service only if V ≥ p resulting in expected utility tE(V − p)+. With some algebra
we obtain:
J(k,t) = J(k,t − 1) + E[max{v − ∆J(k,t − 1),0}]
where ∆J(k,t) = J(k,t) − J(k − 1,t) with boundary condition J(k,0) = 0.
Theorem 1 shows that the decision maker uses the service if the value of the service is greater
than ∆J(k,t) which is the opportunity cost of the kth unit with t periods to go. The threshold is
a function of the pay-per-unit fee, the number of remaining free units, and remaining time until
contract expires.
Theorem 1 1 It is optimal to use the service if and only if V ≥ ∆J(k,t). Moreover i) J(k,t)
is increasing in k and t, ii) ∆J(k,t) is decreasing in k and is increasing in t, iii) ∆J(k,t) is
increasing in p.
The ﬁrst part of Theorem 1 states that the expected utility is increasing in the number of remaining
free units, and the remaining time in the contract. The last two parts of the theorem shows that
the threshold is decreasing in the number of remaining units, increasing in the remaining time t
and per unit price p.
1Papastavrou, Rajagopalan, and Kleywegt (1996) show a similar result for the problem with p = ∞. We omit
the proof of this result. The proof is similar to Papastavrou et. al and available from the authors for continuous
and discrete valuation distributions as well as for a continuous time model with Poisson arrivals.
8Although a rational individual who has inﬁnite computational ability uses the dynamic threshold
policy over time, it is unlikely that a consumer would have the ability to compute and update this
threshold optimally over time. However, this policy suggests plausible heuristics that consumers
may use. We discuss three heuristics in the following section.
3.2 Heuristic Policies
In this section we study three heuristic policies: i) a myopic policy, ii) a totally static threshold
policy and iii) a static threshold with adjustments policy. The myopic and totally static policies
are previously studied by Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) and Borenstein (2009) respectively.
Here we show the connection of the totally static policy to the optimal policy, and then we
propose another heuristic, the static threshold with adjustments, which is the dynamic version of
the totally static policy. This decision rule is structurally similar to the optimal policy but easier
to compute and results in higher consumer surplus than myopic and totally static policies. In
Section 5 we investigate which of the three heuristic policies ﬁt consumption decisions in a cell
phone experiment.
With the myopic policy, or spotlighting (Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004)), consumers focus on
the instantaneous costs and payoﬀs in the current period without considering the eﬀects of the
current period decision for the remainder of the contract duration (i.e.,opportunity cost of the
current decision). Thus consumers of an (x,c,p) contract over T periods use zero as the threshold
when they have free units (i.e. use a free unit for any consumption opportunity that has a positive
value) and use p as the threshold when they run out of free units (use a unit if the value of the
consumption opportunity is greater than the per unit cost p).
The totally static policy, ﬁrst proposed by Borenstein (2009) and used by Grubb and Osborne
(2011), assumes that the consumer picks a threshold at the beginning of the consumption hori-
zon and uses this threshold to ﬁlter the consumption opportunities over time.2 We derive a
static heuristic policy that is asymptotically optimal as the free units in the contract and the
number of consumption opportunities grow. The static threshold with adjustments uses for each
consumption opportunity the totally static threshold that applies for the remaining time.
2In the context of electricity markets, Borenstein (2009) explains this policy as the “behavioral rule” consumers
use to make decisions about their consumption patterns before the consumption period begins. During the con-
sumption period exogenous shocks to the quantity demanded occur, but consumers do not change their behavior
in response.
9A static heuristic is appealing because if an individual uses the same static threshold (behavioral
rule) in all decisions until the expiration of the contract, this simpliﬁes the utility maximization
problem of the previous section. With this policy, the consumer uses the service if its value is
greater than threshold- q if she has free units. Then she ﬁlters the consumption opportunities
by p if she has no free units. The expected utility of a free unit given the value of consumption
is greater than q is given by E(V |V > q). If the consumer has to pay for the service than the
expected utility is E(V − p)+. Combining these two terms, we obtain the expected utility of a
consumer who uses the same static threshold rule:
Js(k,t) = max
q≤p
Js(k,t,q) = E(V |V > q)min(t ¯ F(q),k) + E(V − p)+(t ¯ F(q) − k)+
¯ F(q)
.
where ¯ F(q) = P(V ≥ q). Note that the consumer considers only the expectation of the consump-
tion (ignores the fact that with threshold q consumption is a Binomial random variable with t
and ¯ F(q)), therefore the total number of consumption opportunities ﬁltered with q is equal to
the expectation t ¯ F(q). The ﬁrst term is the utility derived from the consumption of free units,
and the second term accounts for the expected utility derived from the paid units. We deﬁne
q(k,t) = min
￿
0 ≤ q| ¯ F(q) ≤ k
t
￿
as the capacity clearing threshold. Notice that q can not be
larger than the per unit price p, so we have q(k,t,p) = min
￿




Theorem 2 q(k,t,p) maximizes Js(k,t,q).
Theorem 2 shows that capacity clearing threshold bounded by pay per unit fee maximizes the
utility of a consumer who holds a contract with k remaining free units and remaining coverage
time t. Surplus of a consumer if she uses the static threshold q(k,t,p) to ﬁlter the consumption
opportunities is given by u(k,t,p) = Js(k,t) − x. Then the surplus of a consumer who has a
contract (x,c,p) is equal to u(c,T,p) = TE(V −q(c,T,p))++cq(c,T,p)−x. We have the following
structural results regarding the consumer surplus if the consumer uses the static deterministic
threshold policy q(c,λT,p).
Theorem 3 i) u(c,T,p) is increasing and jointly concave in c and T for any ﬁxed p, ii) u(c,T,p)
is decreasing in p for any ﬁxed (c,T), iii) q(c,T,p) is decreasing c, iv) q(c,T,p) is increasing in
T.
Conﬁrming the intuition, Theorem 3 states that the surplus increases as the number of free units
increases. On the other hand, the consumer uses a smaller (higher) threshold as c (T) increases
(decreases). Notice that the static threshold policy mimics the structure of the optimal policy
10closely (Theorem 1). As the expiration time approaches, expected demand decreases, therefore the
consumer uses a lower threshold and uses a free unit for lower valued consumption opportunities.
As the number of free units decrease, the threshold increases and the consumer uses a free unit
for only higher valued consumptions. One can also show that this deterministic static heuristic is
asymptotically optimal (as T and c increases) for the stochastic optimal control problem discussed
above.
The threshold heuristic q(k,t,p) is static in the sense that it ignores the uncertainty in the number
of future consumption opportunities and assumes the number of opportunities is known. Using
this heuristic we can generate the two behavioral predictions for consumers described above. First,
consumers may use a totally static threshold - setting a single threshold at the beginning of the
consumption period that remains constant. Alternately, consumers may use a static threshold
with adjustments - at every consumption opportunity the consumer uses the static threshold
that would apply for the remaining time. This means that the consumer does adjust based on
the length of time remaining and the number of free units left, but does not account for future
adjustments. This increases the expected utility and captures somewhat the dynamic nature of
the optimal policy. Next we study how behavioral biases alter the heuristic policies.
3.3 Over(Under) Estimation and Overconﬁdence
In recent literature, it has been shown that mistaken beliefs on the likelihood of future events
may have signiﬁcant impact on individuals’ decisions (Loewenstein et al. 2003, Eliaz and Spiegler
2006, 2008). In our setting, consumer beliefs about the value and the number of consumption
opportunities may aﬀect their consumption behavior. The following theorem presents how the
threshold of a consumer who over (under) estimates demand or the valuation distribution is
diﬀerent from a rational consumer’s threshold.
Theorem 4 Suppose that V is true valuation distribution and W is consumer’s estimation of
her valuation distribution. If V ﬁrst order stochastically dominates W, V   W, then qW(c,T) ≥
qV (c,T).
If the consumers estimate the upper tail of the valuation distribution to be lighter (heavier) than it
is, then they are more conservative (aggressive) in using free units than they are if their estimates
are correct with static policy and static policy with adjustments. Because of this mistake, they
obtain lower surplus than they would obtain if they knew the true distribution. It is easy to see
11that over(under) estimation has no eﬀect on the myopic policy.
3.4 Risk Aversion
Previous studies on phone tariﬀ choice have also emphasized the immportance of risk aversion.
Miravete (2003) and Train et. al. (1989) ﬁnd that consumers who are uncertain about their
usage rate tend to choose ﬂat rate phone plans to protect themselves from the downside risk of
paying too much if their usage rate turns out to be high. Other researchers (Nunes 2000) do
not ﬁnd a relationship between tariﬀ choice and risk aversion. To see the aﬀect of risk aversion
on in-contract usage behavior, we study how the threshold policy change if consumers are risk
averse in the following theorem. We model risk averse expected utility by introducing diminishing
marginal utility for money. We assume U(y) is a continuous function with U′ ≥ 0 and U′′ ≤ 0.
Theorem 5 Risk averse consumer uses a higher static threshold, qRA(c,T,p) ≥ q(c,T,p), when
c > 0.
Theorem 5 states that risk-averse individuals use the service/product more conservatively when
they have free units to insure against the risk of paying additional fees when all of the free units
are used with both static and static with adjustments policies. When they do not have any free
units, the consumption behavior of a risk averse individual is not diﬀerent than a risk neutral
individual. Risk aversion has no aﬀect on the myopic policy.
3.5 Sunk Cost and the Taxi Meter Eﬀect
A rational consumer should take into account only current and future costs and beneﬁts while
making consumption decisions. However, the psychology and behavioral economics literatures
show that individuals often incorrectly pay attention to sunk costs while making decisions (see
for example Arkes and Blumer (1985)). In access services, if the contract has an access fee and a
number of free units, then the sunk cost of the access fee might aﬀect the consumption decisions
of some individuals. Consumer may then feel disutility proportional to the number of residual
free units at the contract expiration time. While the optimal static threshold policy should lead
consumers to use all free units in expectation, if consumers care about sunk costs the additional
asymmetric utility cost for having excess units (compared to having too few unites) may lead
them to consume the service more aggressively in order to reduce this disutility.
12On the other hand, if the consumer has no free units, or uses all the free units before the contract
expiration, she has to pay p whenever she uses the service. Prelec and Loewenstein (1998)
argue that coupling the payment with the consumption decreases the utility derived from the
service/product. Mental accounting assumes that consumers attribute the disutility of payment
for a good directly to the utility derived from its consumption (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998;
Soman 2001). Paying per use lessens the utility from consumption, as the distaste of paying
is attributed to the consumption at the time of usage. In contrast, payments in advance of
consumption decouple consumption from payment. Several other papers in the literature (e.g.
Lambrecht and Skiera 2006) call this the “taxi meter eﬀect” and suggest it may be one of the
biases that consumers face when choosing among tariﬀs. Here, we consider whether the consumer
acts diﬀerently if she has to pay each time she uses the service. We employ the imputed cost and
beneﬁt concept as described by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) to model the taxi meter aﬀect. V
is the utility from the consumption and ρp is the experience utility lost due to the imputed cost
resulting in net surplus V − (1 + ρ)p. A consumer chooses to consume if the value of the service
is greater than q = (1+ρ)p. If the consumer has the taxi meter bias (i.e. if ρ > 0), the consumer
acts more conservative than a rational individual when consuming costly units (i.e. if p > 0), but
acts rationally when consuming free units (p = 0).
4 Experiment 1: Design
In order to test whether a static threshold policy is a good approximation of individual behavior in
a dynamic consumption problem, we designed a laboratory experiment to simulate the cell phone
consumption problem. Subjects performed four consumption decision tasks, as well as several
tasks designed to identify biases in subject beliefs, risk aversion and the sunk cost fallacy.3 Lastly
subjects ﬁlled out a brief demographic questionnaire.
4.1 Cell Phone Consumption Task
In the simulated cell phone consumption task subjects received 30 phone calls. The calls had
one of ﬁve possible values (drawn randomly) for answering the call: $0.15, $0.30, $0.45, $0.60,
3We also implemented two tasks (based on Zeelenberg et al. 1996 and Zeelenberg and Beattie 1997) designed
to identify regret aversion; however we did not observe enough regret averse subjects in our data to study this
behavior.
13or $0.75.4 In order to allow subjects to have potentially biased beliefs about the distribution of
call values subjects were not told the exact probabilities of each call value.5 Instead, before the
ﬁrst consumption task subjects were told that call values would be drawn independently in each
period from the same distribution throughout the experiment, and then were allowed to draw
sample outcomes from the distribution. Subjects were allowed to draw as many samples as they
wished before continuing with the experiment.6
In each period we used the strategy method to elicit from the subjects whether they would answer
each type of phone call. That is, they were asked (for each call value) if they would want to answer
the call or not, and were told that their conditional strategy would be used to answer the call.
This allows us to observe a subject’s complete consumption strategy for each phone call, rather
than only observing the outcome of their decision. Subjects were then told the actual call value
and whether they had answered it (according to their stated strategy).
Subjects participated on one of three treatments that deﬁned their cell phone plan. In the “0
Calls” treatment subjects began with zero free calls, but had no “monthly fee”. In the “10 Calls”
treatment subjects began with ten free phone calls, and had a $3.50 “monthly fee” deducted from
their payoﬀ at the end of the task. In the “20 Calls” treatment subjects began with twenty free
calls, and had a $7.00 “monthly fee”. In all three treatments subjects had to pay $0.35 to answer
a call if they did not have any free calls left. Subjects could see both the plan details, as well as
the current period and the current number of free calls left, throughout the decision task.
Figure 1 displays what the optimal threshold policy and the optimal static threshold is given the
number of free calls left and the number of remaining periods. The two policies are very similar,
with the optimal policy answering the $0.30 call in more cases than the static threshold.
After receiving all 30 calls subjects were informed of their monthly fee, the total value of all calls
answered, the total charges for answering calls, and their overall payoﬀ. One of the cell phone
tasks was selected randomly for payment.
4The call values had the following probabilities: P($0.75) = 0.15,P($0.60) = 0.25,P($0.45) = 0.25,P($0.30) =
0.25,P($0.15) = 0.10.
5This assumption is also realistic - consumers are unlikely to know in advance the exact probability that they
will receive a certain number of important phone calls in the coming month. Instead consumers must base their
beliefs on previous experience of how likely it is they will use a given number of minutes.
6To speed up the experiment subjects saw ten random outcomes at a time, and also saw a table of the number
of observations of each call value from all of the sampled outcomes.
14Figure 1: Optimal Threshold Policy (left) and Static Threshold Policy (right)
4.2 Beliefs about the Value Distribution
At the start of each consumption task we elicited subject beliefs about the upper and lower tails
of the call value distribution. Subjects were asked to guess how many of the 30 calls would be
$0.75 calls, and how many would be $0.15 calls. For each guess subjects had $0.50 added to their
task payoﬀ if they were correct, or $0.25 if they were within 1 of the correct answer.
4.3 Risk Aversion
To measure risk aversion, after the fourth consumption task subjects were asked to perform the
paired lottery choice task from Holt and Laury (2002).7 Subjects were asked to make ten choices
between a “safe” lottery and a “risky” lottery. Both lotteries had two potential outcomes (with the
risky lottery having a larger diﬀerence between the payoﬀs), and both had the same probability of
high and low value outcomes. The probability of the high outcome increased in 10% increments
from 10% to 100%. For example in one decision the safe lottery was (30% chance of $2.00, 70%
chance of $1.60) while the risky lottery was (30% chance of $3.85, 70% chance of $0.10). Therefore
the safe lottery has a higher expected value when the probability of the high outcome is small,
and the risky lottery has a higher expected value when the probability of the high outcome is
large. Following Holt and Laury we use the number of safe lottery choices as a measure of risk
7We include the diagnostic measures of risk aversion, regret aversion, etc. at the end of the experiment in
order to avoid any potential contamination of subjects’ consumption behavior - which is the main focus of our
study. However, given that these measure have largely no eﬀect on consumption behavior, we do not feel that
contamination across tasks distorted behavior in our experiment.
15aversion.8 One of the lottery decisions was randomly selected for payment.
4.4 Regret Aversion
We use two measures of regret aversion, based on Zeelenberg et al. (1996) and Zeelenberg and
Beattie (1997). Both measures exploit the fact that a regret averse individual does not like to
discover that the choice she made led to a worse outcome than another possible option. Our ﬁrst
measure presents subjects with two additional lottery choices, with the probabilities set (based on
the subject’s previous lottery choices) so that the subject should be roughly indiﬀerent between
the two lotteries. However, for these two choices the subject will be informed of the outcome
of the safe lottery or the risky lottery, in addition to whichever lottery they chose. Therefore, a
regret averse individual should choose the safe lottery for the ﬁrst choice, and the risky lottery
in the second choice - i.e. she should choose the lottery that she will already be informed about.
This means that the subject will not be able to compare the outcomes, and therefore will avoid
regret.
The second measure uses two ultimatum game choices. For the ﬁrst game, proposers will only
be told if the responder accepted or rejected her oﬀer. For the second game, proposers will also
be told the smallest oﬀer the responder would have accepted. Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997)
show that in the second case regret averse proposers make more aggressive (i.e. lower) oﬀers to
avoid the regret of making a higher oﬀer than is necessary to avoid rejection. All subjects make
decisions both as proposers and as responders for both games.
4.5 Sunk Cost
To identify subjects exhibiting the sunk cost fallacy we asked subjects to make a decision for a
hypothetical scenario adapted from Arkes and Blumer (1985). In the scenario subjects were told
that they had accidentally bought tickets for two ski trips on the same weekend. They had paid
more for one trip, but expected to enjoy the other trip more. They were told they could not
return either ticket, and were asked to choose which trip they would go on. Therefore, subjects
who say they would go on the less enjoyable trip that they had paid more for exhibit the sunk
cost fallacy.
8As in Holt and Laury many of our subjects do not have a single decision where they switch from choosing the
safe lottery to choosing the risky lottery.
164.6 Cognitive Ability
For a subset of our sessions we also included a simple measure of cognitive ability. We asked
subjects to solve the three question cognitive reﬂection task from Frederick (2005). Each of the
three questions has an intuitive, but incorrect, answer, while seeing the correct answer takes
somewhat deeper thinking. Frederick argues that the CRT score is a simple measure of a kind of
cognitive ability that correlates well with decision-making heuristics and biases such as present-
biased inter-temporal preferences and risk-seeking to avoid losses. The CRT score also correlates
well with SAT and ACT scores. Subjects in our experiment were paid $0.25 for each correct
answer.
5 Experiment 1: Results
We had a total of 104 students at the University of Michigan participate as subjects, with 36
subjects in the 0 Calls treatment, 36 subjects in the 10 Calls treatment, and 32 subjects in the
20 Calls treatment.9 Sessions lasted approximately 50 minutes, and subjects earned $12.94 on
average.
5.1 Call Answer Decisions
We ﬁrst examine subjects’ consumption decisions. Figure 2 displays for each call type within each
treatment the percent of decisions to answer the call. Furthermore, we display the answer rates
for decisions with and without free calls separately. Answer rates without free calls are similar
across all treatments: subjects answered the three highest call types in 70% to 90% of decisions,
while they answered the two lowest call types in 10% to 20% of decisions. Similarly, when subjects
have free calls they answer the three highest value calls in 80% to 90% of decisions. However,
subjects answer the lowest value calls at substantially higher rates: answering between 30% and
50% of these low value calls.
9Three subjects in the “10 Calls” treatment had to be dropped from the analysis due to a technical problem in
the ﬁrst session.





































The $0.75 call is denoted as call type 1, the $0.60 call is denoted as call type 2, etc.
Figure 2: Answer Rates with and without Free Calls
5.2 Use of a Threshold Policy
We next want to examine whether subjects use a threshold policy in making answering decisions.
Table 1 displays for each treatment the percent of periods in each task where subjects used
a threshold policy to answer calls, as well as the percent of subjects who use a threshold policy
throughout the task.10 Overall subjects used a threshold policy for the majority of their decisions,
however somewhat fewer subjects used a threshold for every decision in a task.11 Furthermore,
subjects appeared to learn to use a threshold policy: subjects in the 10 Calls and 20 Calls
treatments were signiﬁcantly more likely to use a threshold policy throughout the experiment
in Task 4 than they were in Task 1 (test of proportions: p < 0.01 and p = 0.02). Subjects
in the 0 calls treatment were also somewhat more likely to use a threshold policy throughout
(p = 0.09). Additionally, cognitive ability appears to play a role in whether a subject consistently
uses a threshold policy. In the 0 calls treatment subjects who got zero correct in the CRT used
a threshold throughout the task in 46% of tasks, compared to 78% for subjects who got all three
questions correct (non-parametric test for trends: p < 0.01). Similarly in the 10 and 20 calls
treatment, only 38% (13%) who got zero correct consistently used a threshold, compared to 95%
10The second total column shows the percent of subjects who use a threshold policy in each period of all four
tasks.
11While in these data the subjects in the 0 Calls treatment are less likely to use a threshold policy, this does
not appear to be a robust result. Subjects in Experiment 3 with a 0 Calls contract are at least as likely to use a
threshold as other subjects. This is true for the subset of subjects who faced very high random prices (ruling out
sorting eﬀects).
18(75%) who got three questions correct (p < 0.01 for both).
Table 1: Usage of Threshold Policies
% of Decisions with Threshold Policy % Subjects Always Using Threshold Policy
Treatment Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 Total Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 Total
0 Calls 66% 64% 72% 79% 71% 53% 58% 69% 72% 53%
10 Calls 77% 89% 91% 91% 87% 58% 79% 85% 88% 55%
20 Calls 78% 79% 83% 91% 83% 47% 69% 69% 75% 44%
5.3 Answer Policies
We now examine the answer policies for subjects who used a threshold policy. Since these subjects
are using thresholds, we will characterize an answer policy by the number of call types the subject
has chosen to answer. For example, an answer policy equal to 3 means the subject wishes to answer
any call worth $0.45 or more. Figure 3 shows for each treatment what the average answer policy
was in each period, as well as the average number of free calls remaining in each period.


































# Left 10 Optimal
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Figure 3: Answer Policy and Free Call Usage
In the 0 Calls treatment subjects are on average choosing an answer policy very close to their
dominant strategy (answering any call worth at least $0.45) throughout the task. Subjects choose
to answer fewer call types only 6% of the time, and choose to answer more call types only 10%
of the time. In the 10 Calls treatment subjects begin by answering on average all but the lowest
value of calls. This quickly uses up all of their free calls - subjects on average use their last free
call in period 15. Afterwards subjects act very similarly to those in the 0 Calls treatment, on
average answering any call worth at least $0.45. Similarly, in the 20 Calls treatment subjects
begin by answering on average slightly more than 3.5 call types. However, because their free
calls last much longer (until period 26 on average), subjects in this treatment continue to answer
19approximately 3.5 call types on average throughout the task. Overall the average answer policy
is 0.5 higher when subjects have free calls left (2.97 with zero calls left vs. 3.55 with one or more
calls left). This is quite diﬀerent from the myopic policy of answering all calls, and much closer
to the static threshold policies.
Table 2: Answer Policy
VARIABLES Coeﬃcient Std. Error
# Periods Left -0.00436*** (0.00101)
10 Calls Treatment & 0 Calls Left -0.165 (0.140)
20 Calls Treatment & 0 Calls Left -0.294* (0.178)
10 Calls Treatment & 1+ Calls Left 0.577*** (0.148)
20 Calls Treatment & 1+ Calls Left 0.657*** (0.176)
Task #2 0.0428** (0.0212)
Task #3 0.0799*** (0.0202)
Task #4 0.000379 (0.0204)
Constant 3.091*** (0.0965)
Observations 9681
Number of Subjects 100
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is the subject’s answer threshold. The constant term reﬂects the policy in the 0 Calls treatment. The speciﬁcation
is OLS with subject random eﬀects, and the observations are restricted to periods where the subject used a threshold policy.
Table 2 reports the results of regressing subjects’ answer policies on treatment dummies (with
and without free calls), task dummies and the number of remaining periods. The answer policy
with zero free calls is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 3 for any of the treatments in any period
(p > 0.10 for all comparisons). The answer policy with one or more free calls is signiﬁcantly larger
than 3.0 for both the 10 Calls and 20 Calls treatment (p < 0.01 for both comparisons), and the
10 Calls and 20 Calls treatments are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = 0.67). There does not appear
to be a consistent monotonic trend in the answer policy across the consumption tasks.
5.4 Comparison to Optimal Policy
We now compare our experimental results to behavior under the optimal policy, and to the optimal
totally static and static with adjustment threshold policies. Subjects’ answer policies match the
optimal threshold exactly in 62.4% of decisions, including 41.6% of decisions with 1 or more free
calls. Similarly, decisions exactly match the static threshold with adjustments policy in 63.9% of
20decisions, including 44.8% of decisions with 1 or more free calls. In our data the optimal policy
and the static threshold with adjustments policy coincide for 100% of decisions in the 0 Calls
and 10 Calls treatment, and coincide for 89% of decisions in the 20 Calls treatment. When the
optimal threshold and the static threshold with adjustments policies diﬀer, subject’s match the
optimal threshold in 9.8% of decisions, while they match the static threshold with adjustments
policy in 50.7% of decisions (this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant: signed rank test p < 0.01). This suggests
that both the optimal threshold and the static threshold with adjustments are good predictors of
behavior, however the static threshold with adjustments policy matches behavior more closely.
We can also demonstrate that subject’s answer thresholds respond to the decision features that
aﬀect the optimal and static thresholds. Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results of regressing
subjects’ answer policies on dummy variables for the optimal policy. Column 2 reports the same
regression for the static threshold with adjustments policy. In both regressions subjects’ answer
policies signiﬁcantly increase when the optimal policies increase (i.e. the subject has many free
calls left relative to the number of remaining periods). The second speciﬁcation makes clear that
subjects do not use a totally static threshold.
Table 3: Comparison to Optimal Policy
VARIABLES (1) (2)
# Periods Left 0.0184*** 0.0176***
(0.000832) (0.000848)
Optimal Policy = 4 0.400*** 0.520***
(0.0608) (0.179)





Number of Subjects 100 100
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Column 1 uses
the optimal threshold policy as the independent variable, while Column 2 uses the optimal static threshold with adjustments
policy. The speciﬁcation includes subject random eﬀects, and the observations are restricted to periods where the subject
used a threshold policy.
We can also compare the task-level outcomes of subjects to the outcomes that would be obtained
21by using the optimal threshold throughout the task. Table 4 reports for each treatment the
number of answered calls and the average payoﬀ under the optimal policy, as well as the averages
observed for all subjects and for subjects who used a threshold policy throughout the task.
Table 4: Comparison to Optimal Policy Outcomes
Optimal Policy All Subjects
Answered Avg. Answered Avg. % Sub-
Treatment Calls Payoﬀ Calls Payoﬀ Optimal
0 Calls 19.40 $4.37 17.45 $3.23 89%
10 Calls 19.20 $4.33 19.11 $3.55 90%
20 Calls 21.05 $4.33 21.20 $3.17 95%
Optimal Policy Always Use Threshold
Answered Avg. Answered Avg. % Sub-
Treatment Calls Payoﬀ Calls Payoﬀ Optimal
0 Calls 19.32 $4.35 19.82 $4.28 82%
10 Calls 18.98 $4.26 19.60 $3.97 87%
20 Calls 21.12 $4.39 22.24 $3.95 94%
Subjects in the 0 Calls treatments earn signiﬁcantly less than the optimal policy (t-test: p < 0.01).
The majority of this diﬀerence is because subjects who do not use threshold policies answer too
few calls (p = 0.01), however even those who always use a threshold policy earn less than the
optimal amount (p < 0.01). In the 10 Calls treatment subjects who consistently use a threshold
policy earn substantially higher payoﬀs, but even these subjects answer too many calls (p = 0.05)
and earn signiﬁcantly less than they would if they used the optimal policy (p < 0.01). In the
20 Calls treatment subjects also answer signiﬁcantly more calls than is optimal (p = 0.10 for all
subjects, p < 0.01 for subjects who always use a threshold), and earn signiﬁcantly less than the
optimal payoﬀ (p < 0.01 for both), although subjects who use a threshold policy earn 90% of
the optimum. Furthermore, in both the 10 Calls treatment and 20 Calls treatment subject mis-
allocate their calls: the average value the answered calls of threshold-using subjects is signiﬁcantly
lower than the optimum (p < 0.01 for both), i.e. subjects answer too many low value calls relative
to high value calls.12
As Figure 3 makes clear13, much of the deviation from the optimal policy occurs because subjects
12We ﬁnd similar results by comparing actions to the static threshold with adjustments policy - more than 65%
of subjects received a suboptimal payoﬀ in the 10 Calls and 20 Calls treatment, due to answering signiﬁcantly too
many low value calls (p < 0.01 for both)
13The graphs for the optimal policy account for the actual sequence of call values the subjects saw.
22are using their free calls faster than in the optimal policy. Figure 4 shows the percentage of
subjects in each period who have fewer calls in each period than the optimal policy. In the 10
Calls treatment between 40 and 50% of subjects have too few calls during the ﬁrst half of the task,
while in the 20 Calls treatment between 30 and 50% of subjects have too few free calls throughout
the task.





























Figure 4: Average Deviation from Optimal Policy and Average Overusage of Free Calls
We can also compare each individual decision to the optimal policy given the number of free calls
left and the number of remaining periods. This will account for the 11% of period where it is
optimal to answer 0.30 or 0.15 calls. Figure 4 displays for each treatment the average diﬀerence
between subjects’ actual answer policy and the optimal policy in each period. Conﬁrming our
previous analysis, we ﬁnd that subjects in the 10 and 20 Calls treatment answer too many calls
early in the task (when they still have free calls left). When subjects do not have any free calls
they use a policy close to the optimum. We conﬁrm these results by regressing the diﬀerence
between the actual and optimal policy on the number of remaining periods, treatment dummies
and dummies for having 1 or more free calls left. The results are reported in the ﬁrst column of
Table 5. We also report in the second column the diﬀerence between the actual policy and the
static threshold with adjustments policy.
5.5 Determinants of Overuse
We now examine what behavioral factors can help explain why subjects overuse their free calls.
We examine mistaken beliefs, risk aversion, regret aversion, the sunk cost fallacy, and cognitive
ability.
23Table 5: Deviations from Optimal Policy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
# Periods Left 0.00784*** 0.00541*** 0.00766*** 0.00766***
(0.000970) (0.000994) (0.000967) (0.000967)
10 Calls Treatment & 0 Calls Left -0.0808 -0.0988 -0.115 -0.113
(0.148) (0.148) (0.147) (0.146)
20 Calls Treatment & 0 Calls Left -0.334* -0.317* -0.494** -0.498***
(0.193) (0.191) (0.193) (0.193)
10 Calls Treatment & 1+ Calls Left 0.489*** 0.506*** 0.462*** 0.464***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.155) (0.155)
20 Calls Treatment & 1+ Calls Left 0.323* 0.437** 0.182 0.178
(0.191) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190)
$0.75 Guess - E[# $0.75] & 0 Calls Treatment 0.0155*** 0.0160***
(0.00595) (0.00584)
$0.75 Guess - E[# $0.75] & 10 Calls Treatment -0.0233*** -0.0241***
(0.00823) (0.00823)
$0.75 Guess - E[# $0.75] & 20 Calls Treatment -0.00851 -0.00668
(0.0102) (0.0102)
$0.15 Guess - E[# $0.15] & 0 Calls Treatment -0.0165* -0.0172*
(0.00976) (0.00948)
$0.15 Guess - E[# $0.15] & 10 Calls Treatment 0.0109 0.0112
(0.00884) (0.00883)
$0.15 Guess - E[# $0.15] & 20 Calls Treatment 0.0524*** 0.0524***
(0.00855) (0.00848)
Task Controls YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.0921 -0.0593 -0.0948 -0.0975
(0.103) (0.103) (0.106) (0.105)
Observations 9681 9681 9681 9681
Number of Subjects 100 100 100 100
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The dependent
variable in columns 1, 3 and 4 is the diﬀerence between the subject’s answer threshold and the optimal threshold. The
dependent variable in column 2 is the diﬀerence between the subject’s answer threshold and the optimal static threshold with
adjustments policy. The speciﬁcation includes subject random eﬀects, and the observations are restricted to periods where
the subject used a threshold policy. The constant term reﬂects the policy in the 0 Calls treatment. Column 2 uses the true
expectation, while Column 3 uses the expectation derived from the subjects’ sample of outcomes.
245.5.1 Beliefs about the Value Distribution
Subjects tend to overestimate the frequency of both high value $0.75 and low value $0.15 calls,
even after controlling for their initial outcome sample. On average subjects guessed 0.85 more high
value calls and 2.17 more low value calls than they should expect based on the proportion observed
in the sample - both are signiﬁcantly greater than 0 (t-test: p < 0.01, p < 0.01). 35 percent of
subjects overestimate the number of high value calls by at least 1, while 66 percent of subjects
overestimate the number of low value calls by at least 1. Furthermore, many subjects incorrectly
believe the distribution is symmetric: 30% guessed that there would be an equal number of low
and high value calls.
Column 3 of Table 5 includes the diﬀerence between subjects’ guesses and the true expected
number as an additional control, while Column 4 uses the diﬀerence between the guesses and the
expected amount based on the subjects’ initial sample.14 Subjects who have mistaken beliefs (by
either measure) have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent answer policies - in particular subjects with beliefs that
imply undervaluing future consumption opportunities are signiﬁcantly more aggressive in using
free calls. In the 10 Calls treatment this eﬀect comes primarily from subjects who underestimate
the number of high value calls, while in the 20 Calls treatment it comes mostly from subjects who
overestimate the number of high value calls.15
Subjects’ mistaken beliefs appear to be quite persistent throughout the experiment. While beliefs
become somewhat more accurate after the ﬁrst task, the distribution of the $0.75 and $0.15 beliefs
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the last two tasks (rank-sum test: p > 0.60 for both), with the
average of both beliefs signiﬁcantly larger than zero (t-test: p < 0.01 for both). This suggests
that subjects are not approaching correct beliefs over the course of the experiment. Furthermore,
the error in subjects’ beliefs was not signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of sample outcomes
they examined.16
14We ﬁnd essentially the same results if we instead use the deviation from the static threshold policy
15While there are signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the 0 Calls treatment, the two eﬀects tend to cancel for most subjects.
Only 3% of subjects have a predicted beliefs eﬀect of −1.0 or less, and another 2% have a predicted eﬀect of 1.0 or
more
16The median sample size was 100 outcomes. The rank correlations between guess and sample size were ρ = 0.0492
and ρ = −0.0714 (p = 0.32 and p = 0.15, respectively).
255.5.2 Risk Aversion
We follow Holt and Laury and used the number of safe lottery choices as our measure of risk
aversion. As is typical, a majority of our subjects are risk averse, with 55% choosing the safe
lottery at least six times. Column 1 of Table 6 includes a control for risk aversion (the number
of safe choices) for each treatment separately.17 We ﬁnd that risk aversion does not signiﬁcantly
predict deviations from the optimal policy in any treatment, despite the fact that the optimal
policy was determined for a risk neutral consumer.
5.5.3 Regret Aversion
We ﬁnd that 15% of subjects are regret averse under the lottery measure, and 19% of subjects
are regret averse under the ultimatum game measure. Column 2 of Table 6 includes the lottery
measure as an additional control, while Column 3 includes the ultimatum game measure. However,
it does not appear that either measure of regret aversion is signiﬁcantly predictive of consumption
behavior.
5.5.4 The Sunk Cost Fallacy and the Taxi Meter Eﬀect
In our sample 28% of subjects exhibit the sunk cost fallacy. We include a dummy for subjects
who exhibit the sunk cost fallacy in Column 4 of Table 6. However, the consumption behavior of
subjects with the sunk cost fallacy does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from subjects without the fallacy.
We do not ﬁnd evidence of a substantial taxi meter eﬀect on average consumption behavior,
as subjects on average use the optimal answer policy when they do not have free calls (and
therefore have to pay an additional cost for each answered call). If a taxi meter eﬀect inﬂuenced
consumption decisions, we would expect subjects to set their threshold higher than the optimal
amount.
5.5.5 Cognitive Ability
For a subset of our subjects we have a measure of cognitive ability. We ﬁnd a range of performance
on this task: 19% of subjects got zero questions correct, while 36% got all three correct. The
average score was 1.79 correct. We include the CRT score as a measure of cognitive ability in
17For all results in Table 6 we ﬁnd very similar results if we instead use the diﬀerence between the actual answer
policy and the optimal static threshold with adjustments policy.
26Table 6: Alternate Explanations for Deviations
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Periods Left 0.00783*** 0.00784*** 0.00785*** 0.00784*** 0.00957***
(0.000970) (0.000970) (0.000970) (0.000970) (0.00121)
10 Calls Treatment & 0 Calls Left 0.404 -0.0714 -0.0176 -0.161 0.351
(0.533) (0.157) (0.161) (0.158) (0.434)
20 Calls Treatment & 0 Calls Left -0.276 -0.421** -0.177 -0.363 -0.215
(0.714) (0.196) (0.207) (0.223) (0.589)
10 Calls Treatment & 1+ Calls Left 0.974* 0.498*** 0.552*** 0.408** 0.896**
(0.537) (0.164) (0.169) (0.166) (0.466)
20 Calls Treatment & 1+ Calls Left 0.382 0.236 0.480** 0.295 0.466
(0.716) (0.194) (0.205) (0.221) (0.585)
Risk Aversion & 0 Calls Treatment 0.0446
(0.0714)
Risk Aversion & 10 Calls Treatment -0.0421
(0.0491)
Risk Aversion & 20 Calls Treatment 0.0284
(0.0896)
Regret Averse & 0 Calls Treatment -0.605 0.309
(0.480) (0.216)
Regret Averse & 10 Calls Treatment -0.319 0.103
(0.297) (0.340)
Regret Averse & 20 Calls Treatment 0.251 -0.499
(0.554) (0.467)
Sunk Cost Fallacy & 0 Calls Treatment -0.203
(0.279)
Sunk Cost Fallacy & 10 Calls Treatment 0.117
(0.302)
Sunk Cost Fallacy & 20 Calls Treatment -0.0678
(0.360)
CRT Score & 0 Calls Treatment 0.214***
(0.0811)
CRT Score & 10 Calls Treatment -0.118
(0.160)
CRT Score & 20 Calls Treatment 0.0551
(0.252)
Task Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.327 -0.0433 -0.171 -0.0399 -0.517**
(0.441) (0.103) (0.117) (0.105) (0.203)
Observations 9681 9681 9681 9681 5388
Number of Subjects 100 100 100 100 57
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is the diﬀerence between the subject’s answer threshold and the optimal threshold. The speciﬁcation is OLS subject
random eﬀects, and the observations are restricted to periods where the subject used a threshold policy. The constant term
reﬂects the policy in the omitted 0 Calls treatment. Column 2 uses the lottery measure of regret aversion, while Column 3
uses the ultimatum game measure.
27Column 5 of Table 6. Cognitive ability has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on choice in the 10 and 20 Calls
treatment, however subjects with lower CRT scores are signiﬁcantly more conservative (and in fact
too conservative) in the 0 Calls treatment. This is somewhat puzzling, since the 0 Calls treatment
is a much simpler consumption problem. However, since the CRT measures the subjects’ depth
of thinking it may be proxying for boredom and impatience with the task, rather than calculating
ability.
6 Experiment 2
We conducted a second experiment that replicates the ﬁrst experiment, but provides subjects
with the exact distribution of call values (instead of having them draw sample outcomes from
the distribution). While this is arguably less realistic than the experience-based design of our
main experiment, providing a complete description allows us to test whether our results are an
artifact of giving subjects only incomplete information about the value distribution. A total of
36 students participated, with 18 each in the 0 Calls and 10 Calls treatment.
6.1 Results
Figure 5 displays the answer rates for each type of call in each treatment. Subjects’ decisions are
largely similar to our previous results, including a substantial increase in the answer rate of the
$0.30 and $0.15 calls when subjects have free calls. One diﬀerence is that subjects answer the
$0.45 call only 64% of the time with free calls, which is lower than in Experiment 1. We also ﬁnd
that subjects consistently use threshold policies, as in Experiment 1: 87% of decisions in the 0
Calls treatment, and 96% of decisions in the 10 Calls treatment are threshold policies.



































Figure 5: Answer Rates with and without Free Calls
28Subjects is this experiment have signiﬁcantly more accurate beliefs than subjects in our previous
experiment. Subjects overestimate the number of 0.75 calls by 0.66 on average (compared to 0.99
in the Experiment 1, ranksum test p < 0.01), and overestimate the number of 0.15 calls by 1.03
on average (compared to 2.23 in the Experiment 1, ranksum test p < 0.01). Only 22% of guesses
overestimate the number of high value calls by at least 1 (compared to 35%, test of proportions
p < 0.01), and only 53% overestimate the number of low value calls by at least 1 (compared to
66%, test of proportions p < 0.01). It is important to note that these mistakes are likely of a
diﬀerent nature compared to the mistaken beliefs in Experiment 1. Subjects in that experiment
were making a mistake of inference and/or memory, while subjects in this experiment have full
information, and so are making a mistake of calculation.
To test whether subjects overuse their free calls, we again measure the deviation from the optimal
policy as the diﬀerence between a subject’s answer policy and the optimal policy for each call
decision. We then replicated the analysis from Table 5 by regressing the deviation from the
optimal policy on treatment controls and mistaken beliefs.18 As Column 1 demonstrates, we ﬁnd
at least as large an overuse bias for free calls as in the original experiment. This large deviation
from the optimal policy remains when we include controls for beliefs. We do ﬁnd an eﬀect of
mistaken beliefs, however the sign of the eﬀect is reversed from our main experiment. Together
these results conﬁrm that the overuse bias result is robust to the sampling paradigm. Additionally,
they provide further support for our interpretation that mistaken beliefs explain only a part of
the overuse bias eﬀect.
7 Experiment 3
We conducted an additional follow-up experiment to measure subjects’ willingness to pay for
the contracts with free calls (either ten or twenty free calls) instead of having the pay-per-use
contract. Procedures were the same as in Experiment 1, except that at the beginning of each task
subjects were asked to state the largest “monthly fee” that they would be willing to pay for a 10
Calls contract, or a 20 Calls contract. A random fee was then generated, and the subject was
given a contract with 10 Calls (or 20 Calls) and the random fee if their WTP was greater than
the fee. If the subject’s WTP was smaller than the fee, the subject played the task with the 0
18We ﬁnd very similar results using the diﬀerence between the actual policy and the static threshold with adjust-
ments policy.
29Table 7: Deviations from Optimal Policy
VARIABLES (1) (2)
# Periods Left 0.00582*** 0.00590***
(0.00121) (0.00122)
10 Calls Treatment & 0 Calls Left 0.747*** 0.790***
(0.0978) (0.0907)
10 Calls Treatment & 1+ Calls Left -0.0842 -0.0373
(0.0868) (0.0790)
$0.75 Guess - E[# $0.75] & 0 Calls Treatment -0.00896
(0.0161)
$0.75 Guess - E[# $0.75] & 10 Calls Treatment -0.00494
(0.00779)
$0.15 Guess - E[# $0.15] & 0 Calls Treatment -0.00239
(0.0121)
$0.15 Guess - E[# $0.15] & 10 Calls Treatment -0.0738***
(0.0181)




Number of Subjects 36 36
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is the diﬀerence between the subject’s answer threshold and the optimal threshold. The speciﬁcation is OLS with
subject random eﬀects, and the observations are restricted to periods where the subject used a threshold policy. The constant
term reﬂects the policy in the 0 Calls treatment. Column 2 uses the true expectation of the value distribution.
30Calls contract and no fee. We again measured risk aversion the sunk cost fallacy, and cognitive
ability.19 77 subjects participated in this experiment, with 55 providing WTP for ten free calls,
and 22 providing WTP for twenty free calls.
7.1 Results
Consumption behavior is similar to that observed in Experiment 1. In the 10 Calls treatment,
subjects answered 18.95 calls on average when they had the 0 Calls contract, and answered 19.91
calls under the 10 Calls contract. Similarly, subjects in the 20 Calls treatment answered 19.91
calls with the 0 Calls contract, and 23.61 calls with the 20 Calls contract. The average value of
answered calls is $0.53 with the 10 Calls contract (compared to $0.54 in Experiment 1) and $0.52
with the 20 Calls contract (compared to $0.52 in Experiment 1).
The mean willingness to pay for ten free calls was $3.23, with a median of $3.49. 21% of subjects
are willing to pay more than the “face value” of $3.50, while an additional 29% was willing to pay
exactly face value. For twenty free calls the mean willingness to pay was $6.14, with a median of
$6.50. 8% of subjects were willing to pay more than $7.00, with another 34% of subjects willing to
pay exactly $7.00. While this is a smaller fraction of subjects “overpaying”, note that paying the
full pay-per-use price of $7.00 is a larger mistake for the 20 Calls contract, as the subject loses a
substantial option value. Only 51% of subjects received at least twenty high-value calls, whereas
every subject received at least ten calls worth paying the per-use cost for. It is particularly
noteworthy that willingness to pay actually increases slightly from an average of $3.14 in the ﬁrst
task to $3.32 in the fourth for the 10 Calls contract, and increased from $6.17 to $6.23 for the
20 Calls contract. Furthermore the percent of subjects willing to overpay increases signiﬁcantly
from 13% in task one to 27% in task four for the 10 Calls contract. In the 20 Calls treatment
5% of subjects were willing to overpay in both the ﬁrst and fourth periods, with 45% willing to
pay at least full price in both periods. This bias towards free units during tariﬀ choice aligns
with previous results, and is consistent with consumers anticipating feeling a taxi meter eﬀect
during consumption (despite our previous results indicating that a taxi meter eﬀect does not
aﬀect consumption behavior).
Table 8 reports the results of regressing subjects’ willingness to pay on various individual charac-
teristics. While we have previously shown that mistaken beliefs signiﬁcantly inﬂuence consumption
19The two regret aversion measures were eliminated to keep the session length approximately the same.
31Table 8: Willingness to Pay
10 Calls Treatment 20 Calls Treatment
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
$0.75 Guess - E[# $0.75] 0.0368 -0.0336
(0.0269) (0.0541)
$0.15 Guess - E[# $0.15] 0.000489 0.0294
(0.0261) (0.0653)
Risk Aversion -0.0584 -0.223
(0.0460) (0.162)
Sunk Cost 0.106 0.756*
(0.168) (0.425)
CRT Score -0.00942 0.0572
(0.0850) (0.302)
Task Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 3.051*** 3.480*** 3.101*** 3.151*** 6.114*** 7.367*** 6.067*** 6.059***
(0.112) (0.284) (0.136) (0.199) (0.288) (0.858) (0.312) (0.755)
Observations 220 220 220 220 88 88 88 88
Number of Subjects 55 55 55 55 22 22 22 22
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is the subject’s willingness to pay for ten (twenty) free calls. The speciﬁcation includes subject random eﬀects.
32decisions, they do not appear to aﬀect subjects’ willingness to pay for free units of access. This is
useful from the ﬁrm’s perspective, since the kind of mistaken beliefs that lead to overuse of free
calls that the individual is endowed with could potentially reduce their willingness to pay ex ante
for free calls if individuals use these beliefs in evaluating potential contracts. However, it appears
that the decision process to select a contract does not rely upon beliefs in the same way as the
decision process to use a contract. We also again ﬁnd largely no eﬀect of other behavioral factors
such as risk aversion, the sunk cost fallacy and cognitive ability, although there is a marginally
signiﬁcant increase in WTP for 20 Calls among subjects who exhibit the sunk cost fallacy.
We do ﬁnd that some aspects of contract choice aﬀects subjects’ consumption patterns. Table 9
reports the results of regressing the number of calls a subject answered on the randomly generated
monthly fee (odd columns) or the subject’s willingness to pay (even columns). We report observa-
tions for the 0 Calls contract and the 10 Calls contract for the 10 Calls treatment in columns 1-2
and columns 3-4, respectively, and the 0 Calls and 20 Calls contract for the 20 Calls treatment
in colums 5-6 and 7-8. Neither the price paid, nor the subjects’ willingness to pay appear to
aﬀect consumption under either the 10 Calls or 20 Calls contracts. However, subjects in the 10
Calls treatment with a 0 Calls contract who faced a high fee for the 10 Calls contract answer
signiﬁcantly fewer calls than those who faced a lower fee. While a portion of the eﬀect could be
driven by the mere exposure to the price, it appears that this eﬀect can substantially be explained
by a sorting eﬀect: subjects with a higher willingness to pay for free calls consume signiﬁcantly
fewer calls under a pay-for-use contract (i.e. this subset of subjects exhibit a taxi meter eﬀect
on consumption). Therefore, pre-selling access units can have three beneﬁcial eﬀects for the ﬁrm:
it extracts revenue from high-value consumers, it leads to increased usage of the service, and it
screens out from the pay-per-use contract those customers who are least proﬁtable under that
contract. We did not, however, ﬁnd an analogous sorting eﬀect in the 20 Calls treatment, so the
screening beneﬁt may depend on the menu of contracts that the ﬁrm oﬀers.
7.1.1 Optimal Pricing
Given the observed distribution of consumer willingness to pay, and the estimated eﬀects of price
on behavior, we can identify the revenue maximizing fee for the 10 Calls contract. Based on our
data for the willingness to pay for the 10 Calls contract the optimal fee is $3.49 - a very small
discount relative to the per-call price. This leads to an average revenue of $6.97 per customer,
a 15.4% increase over the estimated average revenue of $6.04 if the ﬁrm does not oﬀer a presale
33Table 9: Consumption and Willingness to Pay
10 Calls Treatment 20 Calls Treatment
0 Calls Contract 10 Calls Contract 0 Calls Contract 20 Calls Contract
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Random Fee -1.333** 0.184 -0.151 -0.230
(0.620) (0.340) (0.278) (0.204)
WTP -0.882* 0.183 0.0447 0.152
(0.524) (0.566) (0.274) (0.370)
Constant 23.93*** 21.33*** 19.57*** 19.26*** 20.94*** 19.52*** 24.46*** 22.75***
(2.368) (1.567) (0.716) (1.878) (2.050) (1.560) (0.741) (2.382)
Observations 81 81 139 139 34 34 54 54
Number of Subjects 47 47 55 55 19 19 21 21
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is the total number of calls answered. The speciﬁcation is OLS with subject random eﬀects.
contract. Any price between $2.85 and $4.00 would lead to a revenue increase of up to 10%, and
any price above $2.18 would increase revenue over not preselling. Because the WTP distribution
shifts slightly, we also examine the optimal price given the WTP distribution from task 4. We
again ﬁnd that $3.49 is the optimal price, with an estimated increase in revenue of 15.9%. If
we use the consumption-WTP relationship instead of the consumption-price relationship, we also
ﬁnd that the optimal price of $3.49.
If we do not include the eﬀect of price (or WTP) on consumption under the 0 Calls contract in the
10 Calls treatment, we still ﬁnd the correct price, but would overestimate the potential revenue
from not pre-selling. Under this model preselling units would appear to only increase revenue
by 4.3%. It is therefore important to properly account for the eﬀect of the menu of contracts on
resulting consumption behavior, as this misestimate of the beneﬁts of preselling could adversely
aﬀect ﬁrm decisions.
We can similarly ﬁnd the optimal fee for the 20 Calls contract given our data. As before we ﬁnd
that the optimal price is $6.95 - a very small discount relative the pay-per-use contract.20 This
fee leads to an average revenue of $7.54, a 8.3% increase over the estimated revenue of &6.97 if
the ﬁrm only oﬀers the pay per use contract. Any price between $6.39 and $7.00 would lead to
20To calculate the optimal price for the 20 Calls contract we do not include an eﬀect of WTP on consumption
under the 0 Calls contract, as there was no signiﬁcant eﬀect observed in the 20 Calls treatment.
34an increase in revenue of at least 5%, while any price of at least $6.00 would increase revenue at
least some amount. If we use the WTP distribution from task 4, we again ﬁnd that $6.95 is the
optimal price, with an estimated increase in revenues of 8.9%.
8 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present a plausible decision heuristic (the static threshold with adjustments
policy) that consumers may use consuming access services. A simple static threshold with adjust-
ments policy that accounts for the number of remaining free units and the amount of time left
before the expiration of the contract can lead to expected consumption utility that is close to the
optimal dynamic policy. We also consider how various decision biases (such as mistaken beliefs
about the value distribution, risk aversion, the sunk cost fallacy and the taxi meter eﬀect) could
aﬀect consumption decisions.
We then test our model using a dynamic consumption experiment modeled on cell phone services.
We ﬁnd that a majority of subjects use a threshold policy in making consumption decisions,
with choices matching the static threshold in many cases. However, subjects use free calls too
quickly, leading to average payoﬀs signiﬁcantly below the expected beneﬁt under the optimal
policy. Many subjects exhibit behavioral biases that signiﬁcantly aﬀect behavior: subjects who
underestimate the upper tail of the value distribution or who overestimate the lower tail use free
units more liberally. Furthermore, these mistakes persist throughout the experiment. We also
measure subjects’ willingness to pay for free calls, and ﬁnd that a substantial number are willing
to overpay. This leads to the optimal price involving only a very small discount, and that oﬀering
the optimal three part tariﬀ contract increases revenue by approximately 8 to 15%.
In our study, we ﬁnd support for results of Ascarza, Lambrecht, and Vilcassim (2009). They
indicate that the satiation level of individuals on a three part tariﬀ is on average 31.5% greater
than on a two part tariﬀ. We also ﬁnd subjects over-use minutes when they are on a three part
tariﬀ compared to their usage when they are on a pay-per-use contract. However, Ascarza et. al
do not model the dynamics of consumer decision making or test possible explanations for overuse.
They explain overuse by the additional utility that individuals may obtain from three part tariﬀs
since three part tariﬀs may result in greater enjoyment in usage.
Grubb and Osborne (2011) have estimated a structural model of contract choice and usage in
35cellular-phone services on a data set of individual cellular phone bills. Their paper is very in-
teresting, and shares some of the same insights as our experiment. However, our results suggest
caution in making some of structural assumptions of Grubb and Osborne. On the positive side,
we ﬁnd some supportive evidence for the “inattentive consumption threshold” assumption when
our subjects have free calls. This result disappears when subjects run out of free minutes, but
note that subjects in our experiment could easily tell when they ran out of free minutes, while
this may not be as easy for individuals in their data. On the other hand, we do ﬁnd that subjects
adjust their threshold when they have many free calls left near the end of the period, and we
do not ﬁnd that individuals make optimal consumption decisions given their beliefs, nor do we
ﬁnd that individuals learn in a sophisticated fashion. Instead we ﬁnd that subjects overconsume
beyond what their beliefs justify, and that both mistaken beliefs and overconsumption persist
over time.
One important implication of our results for the broader literature is to caution against the com-
mon assumption that the same biases drive both tariﬀ choice and consumption decisions. While
it is a natural assumption that the same decision process that determines how much a consumer
values access units ex ante also determines how the consumer uses them, our results suggest that
this need not be the case. In our experiment there is only a weak connection between a consumer’s
willingness to pay for free calls, and the subsequent consumption decisions. Moreover, the eﬀect
of biased beliefs about the value distribution that partially explains consumption behavior plays
no role in determining willingness to pay. Thus, it seems there are two distinct decision pro-
cesses that consumers choices: one for tariﬀ selection and another for consumption. This may
be particularly important for empirical research, where researchers typically must make strong
identifying assumptions about consumers’ decisions processes to address consumer heterogeneity
and selection, as well as the inability to observer consumer value distributions, beliefs, etc.
Finally, some of the earlier literature suggests hyperbolic discounting as the potential source of
over-usage of services (Yao et. al. 2011). Our experiment cannot speak directly to this mech-
anism, as all consumption decisions occur within a short span of time. While it is likely that
hyperbolic discounting is indeed a contributing factor to many observed examples of overcon-
sumption behavior, it is of note that we still ﬁnd signiﬁcant over-usage when subjects have free
minutes in setting that rules out hyperbolic discounting.
While our current experiment is focused on the consumption decisions given a speciﬁc contract,
36two natural extensions are to examine further how consumers may choose between potential
contracts given these consumption biases, and how ﬁrms should respond to these biases in con-
sumption behavior in choosing what contracts to oﬀer and how to price the contracts in order to
maximize proﬁt.
379 Appendix
In all the proofs for notational simplicity we assume V has continuous support.
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose t ¯ F(q) < k, then Js(k,t,q) = E(V |V > q)t ¯ F(q) which is
decreasing in q, so q∗ ≤ q(k,t). Now consider the case t ¯ F(q) ≥ k. The ﬁrst order derivative with







¯ F(q) + kq
i
≥ 0 which implies Js is increasing in q.
Therefore, q∗ = min(q(k,t),p).
Proof of Theorem 3: If q(c,T) < p then u(c,T,p) = TE(V − q(c,T))+ + cq(c,T) and the
derivative with respect to T is E(V − q(c,T))+ ≥ 0, the derivative with respect to c is q(c,T).
On the other hand, if q(c,T,p) = p then the derivative with respect to T is E(V − p)+, the
derivative with respect to c is p. We can summarize by writing
∂u(c,T,p)
∂ = E(V − q(c,T,p))+,
∂u(c,T,p)
∂c = q(c,T,p), and
∂u(c,T,p)
∂p = −1(q(c,T) > p)pf(p).
The monotonicity of u(c,T,p) in c and T follows from
∂u(c,T,p)
∂c = q(c,T,p) ≥ 0 and
∂u(c,T,p)
∂T =
E(V − q(c,T,p))+ ≥ 0. Moreover, notice that
∂2u(c,T,p)
∂c2 = − 1
f(q(c,T,p)),
∂2u(c,T,p)












= 0. Therefore, u(c,T,p) is jointly concave
in (c,T) for ﬁxed p.
Proof of Theorem 4: If V   W then ¯ FV (y) ≥ ¯ FW(y) for all y ≥ 0. Therefore, qV (c,T) ≤
qW(c,T) by the deﬁnition of q(c,T).
Proof of Theorem 5: Suppose that U(y) =
y1−r
1−r and the risk averse utility from the consumption
of the service min(T ¯ F(q),c)E(U(V |V > q)) + (T − c
¯ F(q))+E(U((V − p)+)) − x. If T > c, taking







¯ F(q)2 . Since U(V |V > q) is increasing in
q, the derivative is non-negative. Therefore, the optimal threshold is greater or equal to q(c,T).
If T ¯ F(q) ≤ c, taking the derivative of the utility with respect to q we obtain Tf(q)E(U(V |V >





. This can be positive or negative, therefore it is possible to have a
threshold that is strictly higher than q(c,T) with risk averse utility functions.
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